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Unsettling Knowledge: Irony and Education
RICHARD SMITH
Philosophy is sometimes thought of as having two principal
dimensions: one that aims to build systems and doctrines, and
another that is concerned to unsettle fixed ways of thinking.
Richard Peters seems to position himself in both camps. I
suggest that education in the UK today increasingly bears the
marks of rigid thinking, largely as a result of the domination of
neoliberal fundamentalism, and is in particular need of
unsettling. This, I argue, was a major part of western
philosophy’s mission at what we think of as its birth in the
work of Socrates and Plato’s dialogues. In these texts too we
see depicted the arrogance and complacency of characters
who may sometimes remind us of our contemporaries. The
Socratic irony that is evident everywhere in the dialogues is
their undoing.
INTRODUCTION
One way to introduce this paper is to relate the response of a colleague who
had read the flyer for the lecture where I presented an earlier version of it.
It was to the effect that I would no doubt be setting out what philosophy of
education has to say about the current state of education, the curriculum and
so on: a real opportunity, he said, for impact. The unspoken words ‘at last’
seemed to hang in the air. I replied by offering him Søren Kierkegaard’s
famous description of how his life’s mission came to him while taking the
air in Copenhagen’s Fredericksberg Gardens:
So there I sat and smoked my cigar until I lapsed into thought. …‘You
are going on’, I said to myself, ‘to become an old man, without being
anything and without really undertaking to do anything. On the other
hand, wherever you look about you … you see … the many bene-
factors of the age who know how to benefit mankind by making life
easier and easier, some by railways, others by omnibuses and steam-
boats, others by the telegraph, others by easily apprehended com-
pendiums and short recitals of everything worth knowing, and finally
the true benefactors of the age who make spiritual existence in virtue
of thought easier and easier, yet more and more significant. And what
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are you doing?’ … then suddenly this thought flashed through my
mind: ‘You must do something, but inasmuch as with your limited
capacities it will be impossible to make anything easier than it has
become, you must, with the same humanitarian enthusiasm as the oth-
ers, undertake to make something harder’. This notion pleased me im-
mensely … I conceived it as my task to create difficulties everywhere
(Kierkegaard, 1968, pp. 165–166).
Kierkegaard still has the power to disturb: the obvious objections are per-
haps a form of defence. Don’t we want travel to be easier and safer?
Wouldn’t Kierkegaard himself have been grateful for advances in medi-
cal science if they alleviated his suffering or saved his life? If we read
the excerpt carefully, we notice the depth and subtlety of his challenge,
which only makes it more disturbing. The examples go from improvements
to travel and telegraphy and on to easy-to-read compendiums and ‘short
recitals of everything worth knowing’: a movement so smooth that it is
not easy to see where we have crossed the line between clear benefits and
ambivalent ones. Any reader who has nodded along uncritically will surely
come to with a jolt when she reaches the idea of making ‘spiritual existence
in virtue of thought easier and easier’, and will wonder whether, if rational
thinking is inappropriate in the case of spirituality, it might have limitations
elsewhere too.
Kierkegaard brings a caustic irony to bear on several targets here. One
is the expectation that the problems of his time simply require more of the
same kind of scientific knowledge that introduced omnibuses and telegra-
phy in the first place. A second target is less the particular kind of knowl-
edge that impresses his fellow-citizens and more the way in which it is held.
In ‘the many benefactors of the age who know how to benefit mankind’ we
seem to hear, in the repetition that takes us from benefactors to benefits,
the self-satisfied certainty of the most prominent of these citizens that they
are indeed pillars of the community. They are benefactors, and accordingly
their propensity to bring benefits cannot be doubted. The further movement
from ‘know how’ to ‘everything worth knowing’ hints at a deeper compla-
cency. It is not just that the benefactors mistake the kinds of knowledge rel-
evant to different fields of life, as if the same kind is suitable for improving
railways and for deepening the spiritual life: knowledge here is held in the
wrong way, in the form of knowingness rather than the modest awareness
that one can always turn out to be wrong.
In what follows I bring Kierkegaard’s critique to bear on various aspects
of education in our own time. I identify and challenge the widespread ex-
pectation that scientific rationality is the only place to look if we are to
find ways of improving education: the fundamentalism that consists in ex-
pecting there to be one correct answer that will enable us to dismiss all
others, thus condemning us to live in what I have elsewhere (Smith, 2014)
called an ‘epistemic monoculture’. Furthermore I too have the ambition to
resist, to unsettle, ‘the requirement of this age that one must bawl systemati-
cally and crow world-historically’ (Kierkegaard, 1968, p. 163), and not just
because like most educationists I have no improvements to railways and
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omnibuses to boast about. The invention of the light-sabre and teletrans-
portation, which seems to be the model on which the Impact dimension of
the UK’s Research Excellence Framework is conceived, continues to elude
me. I return to this point below.
At the same time, this article having its origins in a Memorial lecture for
that distinguished philosopher of education, Richard Peters, I shall make
some remarks about the use of philosophy in our thinking about education:
how we are to philosophise, to write philosophy or philosophy of education
(in my view nothing interesting hangs on that distinction). Is philosophy
destined to lose standing in the academy if it cannot speak in the language of
those who can come up with settled systems and eye-catching discoveries,
and trumpet their positive impact on the economy? How, in particular, I
want to ask, can we do justice to what might be called the quieter side of
knowledge, the side that concerns itself with what is unsettled, provisional,
uncertain, only partly glimpsed, against the ideal of knowledge that is so
well-grounded that it can, so to speak, be fed directly into the production
line?
SETTLEMENT
Education in the UK has in the last 30 or so years become thoroughly set-
tled. The 1988 Education Reform Act set out the curriculum of the sec-
ondary school in such detail as to homogenise the sector. The effect of
this in turn is that better or worse schooling is, for the most part, just sim-
ply more or less of the same commodity. Competition between schools
on the same, supposedly level playing-field was part of the intention of
the National Curriculum from the start. It makes the comparative quality
of schools seem entirely transparent and facilitates an educational mar-
ketplace where parents can exercise choice among commensurable goods.
The narrowing of the curriculum, where art, music and drama have been
marginalised, even where they have not disappeared altogether, is simply
collateral damage, fed by the suspicion among policy-makers that these are
not ‘proper subjects’ at all.
It is notable how this drive for homogeneity, for settled, uniform and ex-
clusive solutions, increasingly extends all the way down to teaching meth-
ods and other aspects of school culture. Teaching children to read supplies
a memorable example. In the early years of the primary school phonics—
teaching children to link the sounds of words and syllables—has moved
from being one of many aspects of the learning of literacy to becoming ef-
fectively mandatory. ‘Reading by six: How the best schools do it’ describes
phonics as ‘the prime approach to decoding print’ (Ofsted, 2010, p. 42),
the latter a curious synonym for ‘reading’ until you realise that ‘decoding
print’ has been chosen for its suggestion of a mechanistic process where
phonics would be at home. Phonics is, of course, ‘best practice’, a phrase
that occurs in successive paragraphs, 5 and 6 (p. 5). Talk of ‘best practice’,
a phrase used as if there existed somewhere an exemplar equivalent to the
standard meter sealed in the foundation of a building in Paris, also serves
to close down criticism and preempt discussion.
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It is not my intention to adjudicate in the debate over the merits of
phonics.1 What I want to draw attention to is the way in which synthetic
phonics has become for many an article of faith, with the result that schol-
arly and knowledgeable critics are subjected to abuse and attempts to si-
lence them. Andrew Davis, a prominent critic of phonics, describes some
of his own experience of this.2 He sees the teaching of phonics as verging
on a quasi-religious fanaticism whose hallmark, he writes, is ‘the belief that
your faith is correct, the only one that is correct, and that its truth directly
implies the falsity of all other faiths’.
‘Settlement’, of course, has often been a euphemism for ‘destruction’:
European ‘settlers’ largely exterminated, sometimes accidentally but often
deliberately, the indigenous peoples and cultures they encountered. Higher
education in England3 has not escaped being settled. It now seems to be
entirely settled that university education is to be understood purely in terms
of a financial transaction: as a matter of fees incurred, fees to be repaid
(or in many cases unlikely to be repaid), and lucrative overseas markets
to be exploited. The graduate is characterised primarily, or even solely,
as the bearer of ‘employability skills’, which in turn comes down to ex-
pected earnings over the graduate’s lifetime. The UK’s Teaching Excellence
Framework (more fully, The Teaching Excellence and Student Outcomes
Framework) spells out the new order of things: learning is to be understood
in terms of ‘excellence in teaching’, which is largely a matter of how well
universities and colleges ‘ensure excellent outcomes for their students in
terms of graduate-level employment or further study’ (Office for Students,
n.d.).
The implications of this are extraordinary. If on graduation a student
chooses to work for a charity bringing clean water to some of the poor-
est people in Africa, or to spend a couple of years working for a London
church that has a mission to help the homeless, or to join Save the Children
as a fund-raiser, or if she decides to retrain as a midwife (all real examples
of what some of my recent students are now doing, for no great starting
salaries and in two cases virtually none), then according to the UK gov-
ernment they are not enjoying ‘excellent outcomes’ from their university
degrees, and that is my fault—and that of my colleagues—for not teaching
them well enough. If on the other hand we encourage our students to go
into banking, or to join one of the best-known financial advisory services,
where they will be paid well but (if my graduates who took these routes
are anything to go by) not be very happy, then our teaching can be judged
as excellent. This, then, is the new idea of the university. The point—the
meaning—of a university education is only to be expressed in economic
terms. Outcome is income (Smith, 2012): the sterility of the equation shows
us that something has gone very wrong here. It is the language of an intel-
lectual and cultural wasteland.
It is little comfort to observe that education is not the only field where hu-
mane values are being reduced to economic benefits in their crudest forms.
I have given examples from sport, remembrance and literature elsewhere
(Smith, 2015). There is room here for only two brief, recent examples.
The Tour de Yorkshire is a cycle race over several days, in imitation of the
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famous Tour de France. It is advertised partly as an opportunity for the
people of Britain to see some of the most famous cyclists in the world, and
presumably it is hoped that young people will be encouraged to take up
cycling for its many health benefits. But Le Tour’s web pages emphasise
the boost to Yorkshire’s economy: by £98 million in 2018.4 For instance,
in the village of Garforth ‘businesses reported two weeks’ earnings in the
space of 24 hours’, and in the town of Richmond ‘all 12 cash machines ran
out of money on the day they hosted the start of stage three [of the race]’
(ibid.). Similarly the Wigtown Book Festival, in a small town in the west
of Scotland, is proud to advertise that in 2019 it generated £4.3 million for
the Scottish Economy. In doing so, it ‘punched above its weight’,5 which
should settle things once and for all.
It is pleasing to note that these developments are becoming regular ob-
jects of satire. Jonathan Coe in his novel Number 11 (Coe, 2015: the title
reflects the way that power in the UK has moved from 10 Downing Street,
the residence of the Prime Minister, to 11 Downing Street, the residence
of the Chancellor of the Exchequer) offers us an ‘academic expert’ who is
a member of the ‘Institute for Quality Valuation’. In a television interview
she explains that the Institute exists ‘to quantify things that have tradition-
ally been thought of as unquantifiable. Feelings, in other words. A sense of
awe, a sense of wonder …’ (pp. 258–259). She has written a book, Mone-
tizing Wonder. Elsewhere in the novel a character is charged with placing a
monetary value on the Loch Ness Monster—that is, on the myths and leg-
ends that surround this non-existent creature and fuel the profitable tourist
industry in the Scottish Highlands. In Hannah Rothschild’s 2015 novel The
Improbability of Love, the Director of the National Gallery can only se-
cure much-needed funding from the government’s Department of Culture
by mounting initiatives he personally considers meretricious, such as a pro-
gramme for unmarried mothers who, seeing lots of Madonna and Child
paintings, will feel less stigmatised. This can be relied upon to appeal to
the Minister for Culture, to whom talk of the intrinsic value of art or muse-
ums is meaningless. For him, museums and galleries ‘were places to hide
from the rain; like big bus shelters’ (p. 101).6
PHILOSOPHY
In the face of the new economic interpretation of the value of education it
is surely time to resurrect the old argument that education is simply worth-
while in itself. Richard Peters devoted Chapter V of Ethics and Education
to this and returned to it in many other publications. Education, so the ar-
gument runs, is an intrinsic good. It is more than just the acquisition of
skills and capacities, for these do not involve us sufficiently in getting to
grips with principles—that is, in general, with ‘the reason why’. Education
involves knowledge and understanding in such a way as to bring the learner
into the ‘inside’ of the kind of knowledge involved, and this is transforma-
tive for him or her. It is good to be a skilful cook, who earns enough from
her work to support herself and her family and whose customers will en-
joy their food. The skilful cook has her routines and procedures: the master
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chef, on the other hand, grasps the rationale behind them. She understands
why aubergines should be salted before frying, just as the good gardener
is knowledgeable about the composition of soil and the nurse knows not
just that the bed-bound patient needs to be moved often, but also, in some
physiological detail, why.
This line of thought, and the style of the examples, are familiar to those
who have read the philosophy of education written by Richard Peters and
his colleagues, in the 1960s and 1970s especially. Of course they invite the
objection: isn’t this itself a kind of settlement, a rather complacent, even
self-serving doctrine from half a century ago? And hasn’t philosophy made
a habit of attempting to draw up settlements, particularly concerning educa-
tion, ever since Plato drew up a blueprint for the ideal city-state in Republic
(where the discussion of education takes up the whole of Book IV), and
founded philosophy much as we know it in the west today?
There is an important distinction to be made between what we might call
doctrinal philosophy, which attempts the construction of systems, and what
I am here calling ‘unsettling’ philosophy. (My distinction is similar to the
one Richard Rorty makes, between ‘systematic’ and ‘edifying’ philosophy:
I return to Rorty below.) Plato was for many centuries read as a prominent
member of the systematic school, who had political and moral views that,
for reasons never clearly explained, he chose to expound in dialogue form,
with Socrates as his principal mouthpiece. This way of reading Plato re-
ceived fresh impetus from Karl Popper’s 1945 book, The Open Society and
its Enemies, according to which the Republic sets out a strongly totalitar-
ian ideology. Popper’s interpretation proved very influential. Even classical
scholars, who generally did not follow Popper’s political verdict, tended,
like Gregory Vlastos (e.g. 1991, 1994), to regard the Platonic dialogues
as steadily less influenced by Socrates and increasingly the expression of
Plato’s own doctrines. A significant problem with this view however is that
there is no clear evidence of the order in which the dialogues were com-
posed, with the result that the move from Socratic dialogue to Platonic doc-
trine seems sometimes to be taken as reflecting the order of the texts and
sometimes as evidence for it.
There is no space here to expand on these theories and the extent to which
they have now fallen out of fashion.7 I only note that at present Plato’s works
are more and more being read as texts: that is to say they are read with close
attention to detail, with an abandoning of the old assumption that some
parts of them are philosophical and other parts are not; with a refusal even
to categorise them as ‘philosophy’ at all, as opposed to a kind of rhapsodic
writing (Statkiewicz, 2009) that is as close to poetry as it is to what has been
thought of as philosophy in recent times. Just as no sophisticated reader of
Shakespeare or Alan Bennett imagines that a character in one of his plays
voices the playwright’s own opinions, equally we should not suppose that
any interlocutor in the dialogues—not even Socrates—is a mask for Plato
(Press, 2000). In his introduction to his 1997 edition of Plato’s Complete
Works, for example, J.M. Cooper writes firmly that Plato rejects, as Socrates
did, the idea of the philosopher ‘as a wise man who hands down the truth to
other mortals for their grateful acceptance … It is important to realize that
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whatever is stated in his works is stated by one or other of his characters,
not directly by Plato’ (p. xix). More recently, Jill Frank (2018) observes
that it is very odd to think otherwise when Plato has gone to great lengths
to remove himself from the dialogues: ‘the Platonic narrator is never Plato’
(p. 22). Plato himself never appears in his dialogues. The nearest thing to an
appearance is his explicit absence: Phaedo, the narrator of the dialogue that
took place during the final day of Socrates’ life, gives the names of those
who were present with him in his prison cell (Phaedo, 59b-c) but says that
Plato was not there: he was ill.
From this perspective it is possible to see that, at what has been called
the dawn of western philosophy, Plato wrote about the importance less of
building systems of knowledge than of unsettling over-confident claims to
knowledge: claims that are rash, immature or otherwise ill-founded. The
dialogue Euthyphro, for example, depicts an encounter between Socrates
and a youth so certain of his duties to the gods that he is prosecuting his
own father for complicity in the death of a slave on the family’s farmland:
Socrates: But tell me, Euthyphro, do you really believe that you un-
derstand the ruling of the divine law, and what makes actions pious
and impious, so accurately that in the circumstances that you describe
you have no misgivings? Aren’t you afraid that in taking your fa-
ther into court you may turn out to be committing an act of impiety
yourself?
Euthyphro: No, Socrates; I shouldn’t be worth much, and Euthyphro
would be no better than the common run of men, if I didn’t have ac-
curate knowledge about all that sort of thing (Plato, Euthyphro, 4–5,
1959).
Euthyphro claims ‘accurate’ knowledge, as if there could be such a thing
in the field of religious or moral duty. The idea of ‘exact’, ‘accurate’ or
‘precise’ knowledge seems more appropriate to mathematics and geome-
try, and another of Plato’s dialogues presents a young man who hopes to
acquire knowledge of just this sort. Theaetetus, in the dialogue that bears
his name, does not display the cocksureness of Euthyphro, but his study
of geometry, in which he is proficient, has led him to think the acquisition
of knowledge is generally linear and sequential. His tutor, Theodorus, tells
Socrates approvingly that his pupil ‘approaches his studies in a smooth,
sure, effective way … it reminds one of the quiet flow of a stream of oil.
The result is that it is astonishing to see how he gets through his work, at
his age’ (Plato, Theaetetus, 144b, 1992). Theaetetus is in danger of suppos-
ing that all learning proceeds like an idealised geometry lesson, from one
axiom to another. It is significant that he accepts uncritically Socrates’ sug-
gestion, which can only be ironic, that knowledge and wisdom are the same
thing (145e) and he readily agrees with each in turn of Socrates’ accounts of
the nature of knowledge—for instance, that knowledge is perception.8 He,
like Euthyphro and the reader of the dialogues, needs to have his confidence
shaken before he can make intellectual progress: and it is this shaking that
the dialogue depicts, rather than any positive conclusion about the nature
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of ‘the right’, or of knowledge, that we might have expected the dialogue to
lead to. Similarly Phaedrus, in the dialogue named after him, needs to learn
that simply sitting at the feet of Socrates by the river Ilissus—and holding
with him a conversation that touches on love, the nature of the soul and
the priority of speaking over writing (how flattering! For having a conver-
sation is just what Phaedrus and Socrates are doing)—does not make him a
philosopher. Even by the very end of the dialogue Phaedrus does not under-
stand this, apparently regarding himself as Socrates’ equal. Socrates offers
a prayer to Pan and all the other gods of the place where they have been
talking. Phaedrus asks him to ‘make it a prayer for me too: for what friends
have they share’ (279c).
If philosophers of education have not always been prominent in embrac-
ing the unsettling mission of philosophy, that may be connected with their
response to the philosophers who have most exemplified it. There has been
very little attention at all paid to Kierkegaard in Anglophone philosophy
of education. The ‘therapeutic’ nature of Wittgenstein’s later writings has
been thematised, but with an emphasis on the dissolving of philosophical
problems, as if this simply offered relief. The tendency of those problems,
such as the way we are captivated by the picture of science, to recur and
haunt us continually, so that we are unsettled by the cure as much as by the
original disease, has been relatively neglected.
The reception of the Platonic dialogues by philosophers of education in
particular has until recently focused almost entirely on the Republic, pre-
sumably because it is there that Plato is thought to discuss the institutional
arrangements of education and to present a blueprint for the ideal educa-
tion in a city-state. It is only relatively recently that the educational sig-
nificance, in the widest sense, of dialogues such as Euthyphro, Theaetetus,
Phaedrus and Meno—where we see the character from whom the dialogue
takes its name undergoing the challenge to settled thinking that is the pre-
condition of making any real educational progress, for the young men of
Athens as for young people today—has begun to be explored.9 Even when
discussing the Republic, philosophers of education seldom distinguish Plato
from Socrates, or from the ‘Socrates’ who is the protagonist of the dialogue,
and display a deaf ear to the irony of this complex ‘framing’ of the dia-
logue (if we can call it a dialogue) that here as elsewhere in Plato’s writings
seems to preclude any literal, straightforward reading (Smith, 2014). It is
even common to find philosophers of education writing about Plato airily
without reference at all to any particular text or passage in it, as if the dia-
logues constituted a consistent whole; Plato is repeatedly said to have held
‘doctrines’, ‘theories’, ‘principles’ or similar.
Richard Peters was a man of his time, so we should be neither surprised
nor disappointed that in his 1966 book Ethics and Education he wrote that
Plato held a ‘theory of forms’ (pp. 24, 102); that he and Socrates—the two
not being in any way distinguished from each other—held a ‘doctrine’ that
‘virtue is knowledge’ (p. 31); that Plato, along with Aristotle and Spinoza,
held a ‘doctrine of function’ (p. 153); that Plato’s ‘system’ contains princi-
ples of practical reason (p. 209). There are many other remarks of a sim-
ilar nature, all tending towards a reading according to which, so far from
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unsettling our ideas, Plato is concerned to pass onto us a final and authori-
tative theoretical system rather than to teach us to think for ourselves.
Yet this reading of Plato seems at odds with a fundamental theme of
Peters’ writings and in particular his view of the nature of philosophy of
education. Here are the opening words of Ethics and Education: ‘There
was a time when it was taken for granted that the philosophy of education
consisted in the formulation of high-level directives which would guide ed-
ucational practice and shape the organisation of schools and universities’
(p. 15). These words are echoed in Chapter 1: ‘It might be thought that the
obvious way of beginning a study in the philosophy of education would
be to formulate a definition of “education”’ (p. 23). Here is the philosopher
challenging from the start the expectations of the age, creating difficulties—
or, to use the terms of my title, unsettling what is taken for granted, what
is thought to be the obvious way forward, which starts with the offer of
certainty supplied by a definition and results in having an impact on educa-
tional practice in schools and universities.
This tension between what I am here calling ‘settled’ and ‘unsettled’ phi-
losophy suggests that we might devote more thought than we often do to
what is ‘philosophical’ in thinking about education and our other public
goods and services, as it was until recently natural to call them. If we can-
not confidently think of philosophy as one of the foundational disciplines
of educational thought—that is, a settled base to build truths upon—as it
was conceived for many years in the wake of the work of Richard Peters
and his colleagues, just how are we to characterise it? And this is related
to another theme, which is never far from the surface of this paper, as it is
never far below the surface of Richard Peters’ writings: the question of the
ends and purposes of education, of just what education is for, a question
which, as I shall try to explain in the next section, cannot be separated from
the issue of how we are to go about addressing the question of the value
of education—how we are to write about it and talk about it, what genres
or disciplines or styles of thought or text will best serve us here. To puzzle
over the nature of philosophy itself is thus no merely introspective exercise,
a distraction from important practical issues in education that demand our
attention.
CHANGING THE DISCOURSE
The power of satire—particularly its power to expose as ridiculous what has
become or is becoming ‘the new normal’—may make us wonder whether
philosophy is always our best weapon in exposing the follies of our age.
Some of philosophy’s most famous exponents, fortunately, have been adept
at shaking—unsettling—our confidence in philosophy itself as a distinctive
form of enquiry: from Plato’s use of the dialogue form to disavow any doc-
trinal intentions to Nietzsche’s maxim that ‘pleasure in mockery’ is a sign
of (philosophical) health.10
There are prominent modern philosophers too who are happy to unset-
tle our confidence in philosophy itself as a distinctive form of enquiry. The
US philosopher Richard Rorty, for example, takes the view, especially in
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Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), that radical social changes gen-
erally take place not because an individual philosopher or thinker, or even
a group of them, puts forward an irrefutable argument: it is more that a
language which has long seemed to be the only language to use starts to
seem old-fashioned or inadequate. He gives the example (p. 12) of how
‘the traditional Aristotelian vocabulary got in the way of the mathematical
vocabulary that was being developed in the sixteenth century by students
of mechanics’ and accordingly was eclipsed by it. We should, he writes,
think less in terms of arguments, rigour and clarity, which we might take
to be the distinctive tools and badges of philosophy, and more in terms of
changes in language. When a vocabulary becomes ‘entrenched’—when it
becomes, as we might put it, little more than rhetoric or jargon—and is
experienced as unhelpful, stopping us from saying the things we feel we
want to say, conventional philosophical critique is largely ineffectual be-
cause it tends to operate with the same central concepts whose limitations
it is attempting to expose. A good example (mine, not Rorty’s) is the way in
which the language of performativity, of efficiency and effectiveness, skills
and performance indicators, has a habit of re-emerging in attempts at dif-
ferent discourses about the purpose of education. The way forward, Rorty
writes, is
To redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have cre-
ated a pattern of linguistic behavior which will tempt the rising gen-
eration to adopt it, thereby causing them to look for appropriate new
forms of nonlinguistic behaviour, for example, the adoption of new
scientific equipment or new social institutions. This sort of philoso-
phy does not work piece by piece, analysing concept after concept,
or testing thesis after thesis. Rather, it works holistically and prag-
matically. It says things like ‘try thinking of it this way’—or more
specifically, ‘try to ignore the apparently futile traditional questions
by substituting the following new and possibly interesting questions’
(1989, p. 9).
On this view the best way of countering and replacing bad ideas often in-
volves finding a new language or vocabulary, and it is this, rather than log-
ically compelling arguments, that makes cultural change possible. The new
language might even involve the recovery of an older language: of Plato,
for instance, or John Dewey, or indeed Richard Peters—but now thought
of as a language that allows us to say what we want to say rather than one
which perfectly mirrors the way the world is.
Stefan Collini makes a very similar point about the justification of the
humanities in his book, What Are Universities For? (2012). The best way
to undertake such justification, he writes, may be simply (and, I take it,
repeatedly) to say ‘See, this is what we do: terrific, isn’t it?’ while, as Collini
puts it, dumping a ‘huge pile of excellent scholarly books on the steps of the
relevant ministry’. The fatal move would be to be drawn into speaking the
language, no doubt the instrumental language of the bottom line, of ‘sober-
suited self-styled administrative realists’ (p. 84). The proper way to justify
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the humanities—and the point can be applied just as well to the justification
of education for its own sake—may be, he writes:
as much a matter of tone and confidence as it is of definitions and
arguments … [The humanities] are ways of encountering the record
of human activity in its greatest richness and diversity. To attempt to
deepen our understanding of this or that aspect of that activity is an
intelligible and purposeful expression of disciplined human curiosity
and is—insofar as the phrase makes any sense in this context—an end
in itself (p. 85).
Collini describes what he calls his ‘remarks’ as ‘deliberately intransigent’
and observes that ‘very little that is of any interest or significance in our
lives is like a crossword puzzle or a chess problem’ (ibid.). That is to say
it is not like a piece of formal logic. The point is a quintessentially Aris-
totelian one: that precision is to be sought just so far as the nature of the
subject admits. ‘It is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning
from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs’
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b11-27, 1969).
Now it might seem that Rorty and Collini are recommending rhetoric,
rather than philosophy; or saying, in Rorty’s case, that we shall be bet-
ter able to say what we want to say—what we want to be heard and
understood—if we are less haunted by the idea that there is an unbridgeable
gap between philosophy and other modes of discourse. Collini deploys a
splendid polemical rhetoric of his own, suggesting that this will prove more
effective than philosophy in turning the barbarians back from the gates. But
of course there are forms of philosophy which are themselves close to liter-
ature and rhetoric and often hard to distinguish from them. The point is not
that we need to give up on philosophy altogether.
INTRINSIC VALUE
The questions of just what education is for, and how philosophy, or philos-
ophy of education, can help us make progress in thinking about this, should
I think puzzle us—should unsettle us—rather more than they seem to do.
Let me start on this line of thought by quoting Richard Peters again. He
writes (1966, p. 46) that various views of education have proved inadequate
because they overemphasise one or other criterion and underemphasise or
omit others.
The traditional view of ‘education’, for instance, emphasised the matter
and cognitive perspective of ‘education’ rather than its manner; the child-
centred view drew attention to questions concerned with its manner and
rather evaded the question of its matter; views which build up an account
of ‘education’ by extrapolating what is involved in acquiring skills ignore
its cognitive perspective.
We might think of this, I suggest, less as an invitation to rejoin these de-
bates equipped with the traditional and established armoury of philosophy
than as an opportunity to rethink what ways of doing philosophy—
what ways of writing and thinking—might prove interesting, helpful,
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provocative and of course unsettling. Taking Peters’ remarks in reverse
order, the enthusiasm for workplace and employability skills (with the
accompanying assumption that we know what these are, and the even more
unlikely assumption that we know what they will be in the future) threatens
loss of ‘cognitive perspective’ in a challenge to traditional subjects and
disciplines. It does not take much to imagine or foresee the replacement
of subject-based university modules with courses in You and Your CV,
and Introduction to Entrepreneurship (which I interpret as combining
desperation to hit graduate employment targets with a recognition that
traditional graduate jobs are disappearing, not forgetting that state support
for self-employment means fewer in the job-seeker’s allowance category).
This suggests that important work is to be done in articulating the benefits,
in more than crude instrumental terms, of many of the subjects traditionally
studied in schools and universities. It also points to the need to think more
carefully about the intrinsic value of the possession of skills, properly
so called, in situating the individual in a healthy relationship with the
material world in which she finds herself. What Richard Peters called ‘the
child-centred view’ has come around again: its new guise is ‘the teaching
of happiness’ and concern about young people’s mental health. No-one
could deny that we want our young people to be happy rather than at or
near the bottom of every league-table of happiness in the western world,
not forgetting the savings to the National Health Service if there are fewer
cases of depression, self-harm and eating disorders to treat. But here
naturally we encounter those who claim to know that traditional education
is letting our young people down and should be replaced with happiness
lessons.
If the problem is that education has become commercialised and instru-
mentalised, then the research and thinking—the research which consists in
thinking, especially—that need to be done here, however, come up sharply
against the difficulty of offering a justification of anything ‘for its own
sake’. As Plato has Socrates observe in the Republic, it’s no good recom-
mending dikaiosune, justice or ‘the right’, for the sake of its consequences,
for this will be to recommend it not for itself but for the sake of something
else. So too with education. Any ground on which we justify it risks being
other than the thing itself, the Platonic form, so to speak, pure, eternal and
uncompromised by extrinsic considerations. Richard Peters and his follow-
ers were of course attracted by a ‘transcendental’ justification of education,
along the lines that just as anyone who asks what the value of truth is shows
by their very question their commitment to truth (we cannot imagine some-
one asking ‘Tell me why truth is valuable, and you can lie about it if you
like’); so too any enquiry into the purposes of education presupposes an ac-
ceptance of the kinds of values and ideas without which the enquiry cannot
get off the ground. There now seems to be a general agreement that this
kind of argument does not do the work required of it (see e.g. Hand, 2009).
Assuming that this is so, how then are we to talk, to write, to philosophise
about intrinsic goods?
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IRONY IN CONCLUSION
As the discussion so far has suggested, the issue of intrinsic value and that
of the nature of philosophy are closely connected. On one conception of
the nature of philosophy—especially one that prides itself on the rigour of
the discipline—philosophy can offer no argument for the intrinsic value
of anything, and can say little beyond reminding us that offering reasons
for the intrinsic value of, say, education, will always amount to justifying
education not in itself but in terms of its consequences. This is partly why,
in the Republic, Plato has Socrates examine the value of justice by analogy,
addressing the issue in the context not of the individual but that of the city-
state or polis, on the grounds that what emerges ‘writ large’ in the latter
context can then be applied to the individual and how his or her life ought
to be lived. We are simply to see that the just polis is one we would choose
to live our life in. In a similar way Collini writes that there is no better
way of getting the relevant politicians and administrators to recognise how
‘terrific’ academics’ books and other publications are than by unloading
them at their doors for them to read.
Here, then, is a great irony at the heart of philosophy. At the very point
where philosophy seems called on to press home arguments for the intrin-
sic value of goods such as education and of course for philosophy itself,
it can offer only analogy, anecdote, myth and legend (as in the Republic
and elsewhere in Plato’s dialogues), metaphor, reflections on language it-
self, rhetoric and persuasion rather than the quasi-geometric, compelling
force of logic. It presents us from time to time with characters in dia-
logue with one another, texts within texts, masks and pseudonyms (those
adopted by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, for instance). Sometimes comedy
and drama come close to philosophy, as when ‘Socrates’ appears in Aristo-
phanes’ Clouds. It employs unreliable narrators: Plato is often at pains to
present his dialogues as related by those whose authority for doing so is
undercut in one way or another, and whose memory of them is implausi-
bly prodigious. Serious philosophy can include fairy-story without loss of
philosophical power, as the story of Er in the Republic shows (Smith, 2014).
Yet this is not to say that there are some areas of discussion where it
seems philosophy can ‘offer only analogy, anecdote, myth and legend’ and
so on. This could only be said ironically because (to repeat the argument),
taken literally, it implies that philosophy is most itself—most true to what
philosophy at its best can be—when it supplies more rigorous arguments
and justifications: ones of a geometric or mathematical kind, perhaps. The
history of European philosophy, from Descartes to the early Wittgenstein,
is one of fascination with, not to say bewitchment by, the tropes and forms
of mathematic and geometric proofs and demonstrations, and philosophers
of education have not been immune to it. It is an indictment of millen-
nia of the study and writing of philosophy in the western tradition that we
need to go back to Plato and a handful of other philosophers, largely those
whom Richard Rorty calls ‘edifying’ rather than ‘systematic’, who have
resisted the demand for philosophy to culminate in certainty.11 That de-
mand, as I indicated near the beginning of this paper, seems bound to be
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exacerbated by the current expectation, in the UK and increasingly else-
where, for philosophers, like other academics, to bawl and crow about the
importance of their work as they try to demonstrate its ‘impact’. Irony, to
state the obvious perhaps, does not fit comfortably with such expectations
since the ironist inclines to modesty about her work, acknowledging its un-
settling shortcomings and paradoxes. She is out of step with the spirit of
the age; but her kind of philosophy, sceptical of certainties and fundamen-
talisms, and prepared to put itself in question, can help us engage with some
of our most difficult challenges: how to think about education, and so how
to prepare humankind for the future.12
Correspondence: Richard Smith, School of Education, University of
Durham, DH1 1TA, UK.
Email: r.d.smith@durham.ac.uk
NOTES
1. There are in fact many objections to the exclusive teaching of phonics of the kind prescribed.
For example, it is tested by the child reading a list of isolated words to the teacher, including
nonsense words (such as ‘strom’) which must be sounded out phonetically (apparently some
children charitably correct these to words that make sense, such as ‘storm’, and lose marks
in consequence). This is not an approach that teaches a child to read for meaning, let alone
pleasure. English moreover is phonetically a highly irregular language: it is usual to cite the
phonetic diversity of words ending in –ough, such as ‘thorough’, ‘rough’, ‘bough’ (of a tree),
‘cough’, ‘through’, or those ending in –ove (‘dove’, ‘drove’, ‘move’). Variety of pronunciation
around as well as within regions of the UK constitutes a further problem in phonics teaching
that is seldom acknowledged.
2. See, for example, an article entitled ‘Outstanding Overview Addresses Nonsense in Davis’
paper’. Available online at: http://rrf.org.uk/messageforum/viewtopic.php?f=1%26t=5887%
26hilit=Davis. Accessed 2 May 2020.
3. Here it is necessary to distinguish England from the other jurisdictions of the UK—Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland—which have not followed the Westminster government in such
matters as charging students exorbitantly high tuition fees that in most cases they can only
afford by taking out loans, the repayment of which will follow them well into their adult lives.
4. See https://letour.yorkshire.com/the-latest/tour-de-yorkshire-boosts-county-s-economy-by-
98-million/. Accessed 3 May 2020.
5. See https://www.thebookseller.com/news/wigtown-book-festival-punches-above-its-weight-
generating-43m-scottish-economy-1175226. Accessed 3 May 2020.
6. The satire’s targets are real. They emanate from the demand for what is called social return on
investment. Morse et al., 2015, offer a rich example.
7. For an excellent brief overview, see Press, 2000, pp. 1–6.
8. Blondell, 2002, pp. 260 ff, writes that Theaetetus is a ‘paradigm of the promising young philo-
sophical nature’ and a kind of second Socrates intellectually. In my view the dialogue shows,
rather, how great the gap is between Socrates and even an unusually clever young man.
9. See, e.g., Fendt and Rozema, 1998.
10. ‘Objection, evasion, happy distrust, pleasure in mockery are signs of health: everything uncon-
ditional belongs in pathology’ (Nietzsche, 1990, § 154).
11. Those whom Rorty identifies as ‘edifying’ philosophers include Kierkegaard, Santayana,
William James, Dewey, the later Wittgenstein, and the later Heidegger (1979, p. 367).
12. An early version of this paper was given in Cambridge in May 2014 as part of the R.S. Peters
Memorial Lecture Series. I am grateful to the many members of the audience who made helpful
comments, and to Paul Standish both for inviting me to give the lecture and for his suggestions
for improvements to the text of this paper.
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